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I 
In this paper I intend to explicate Hegel's notion 
of the 'cunning of Reason' and the role of the world-
historical individual in the process of historical 
development. Given the complex and multi-faceted 
nature of Hegel's philosophical system, I will approach 
this topic from three different perspectives, which 
correspond to the three main divisions within the 
paper. In the first part, I begin with a general over-
view of Hegel's philosophical conception of history, 
especially with regard to the notions of Spirit and 
Nature, and the relationship between passion and the 
Idea. This will lead to the second part of the paper 
wherein I will focus on the unique status of the world-
historical individual. Of particular interest will be 
an investigation of the dialectic between the subjec-
tive intentions of the historical individual and the 
objective results of his actions which Hegel refers to 
as the 'cunning of Reason'--that which mediates between 
intent and consequence and which is capable of 
realizing consequences which go beyond the conscious 
intent of the historical actor. Finally, in the third 
part, I will return to a discussion of the 'cunning of 
Reason', but this time considered in the purely theo-
retical context of Hegel's Logic. It is hoped that by 
approaching Hegel from these various levels, what Hegel 
means by the 'cunning of Reason1 and how he understands 
the position of the world-historical individual v/ill be 
made apparent. 
II 
In the context of Hegel's philosophical system, 
world history is "the exhibition of Spirit in the 
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process of working out the knowledge of that which it 
is potentially11] Since the essence of Spirit is 
freedom and self-consciousness, the history of the 
world, as well as its final cause, is none other than 
the development of Spirit's awareness of its own 
freedom, and consequently, the reality of that 
•freedom. [ 2 ] 
Given this general conception of history, Hegel em-
phasizes that if one is to understand this process of 
the self-development of Spirit then one must be aware 
of the difference between the Idea or principle of 
Spirit and its realization in the world of concrete 
existence.13] What he calls the aim, principle, or 
Idea of Spirit is something 'merely general and 
abstract1. This principle is the implicit or un-
developed essence of Spirit which as such is not com-
pletely real or actual. Hegel conceives of the Idea of 
Spirit as being analogous to those aims and ideas that 
we have in our thoughts, but which have not been made 
actual in the real world.[4| These aims and ideas, 
like the Idea of Spirit, present themselves as pos-
sibilities or potentialities which have yet to achieve 
actual existence. In order to produce actuality, in 
order for this abstract principle to attain reali-
zation, a second element is required. The introduction 
of this second element brings us to a discussion of the 
means whereby this principle of freedom is realized or 
made actual. It is with the means that v/e come face to 
face with the phenomenon of history itself, for the 
power of this second element is revealed in the ac-
tivity of man. It is only in human activity, i.e., 
human history, that the abstract Idea of Spirit as 
freedom can be fully actualized. Furthermore, the 
motive power of human activity which actualizes the 
Idea of Spirit and its characteristics, that is, makes 
it conscious of itself by giving this abstract essence 
determinate, objective existence, is the need, passion, 
and instinct of man. 
The first glance of History convinces us that the 
actions of men proceed from their needs, their 
passions, their characteristics and talents; and 
impresses us with the belief that such needs, 
passions and instincts are the sole springs of 
action--the efficient agents in this scene of 
activity. . . . Their power lies in the fact 
that they respect none of the limitations which 
justice and morality would impose on them,- and 
that these natural impulses have a more direct 
influence over man than the artificial and 
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tedious discipline that tends to order and self-
restraint, law and morality.|5J 
With the introduction of this second element it 
must be noted that this element is not something other 
than Spirit which is merely used by Spirit as a means 
or an instrument for achieving its own ends. On the 
contrary: 
The realm of Spirit is all-comprehensive; it 
includes everything that ever has interested or 
ever will interest man. Man is active in it; 
whatever he does, he is the creature within which 
Spirit works. Hence it is of interest, in the 
course of history, to learn to know spiritual 
nature in its existence, that is, the point where 
Spirit and Nature unite, namely, human nature.[6J 
In this way, two elements in conjunction compose the 
object of historical investigation: the first is the 
Idea (of Spirit), and the second is the complex of 
human passions (Nature).(7) It is only in human nature 
that these two elements are found united in one being. 
The Idea of freedom is the essence of Spirit and the 
absolute goal of historical development. Human pas-
sions, informed by the Idea, are the means by which the 
subjective, abstract Idea of freedom, latent in human 
nature, is realized or actualized in the objective 
world. 
Hegel's consideration of passion and its role in 
history is somewhat complicated and involves a com-
bination of the following terms: 'will', 'character', 
and 'intelligence'.(8) As a preliminary definition, he 
characterizes passion as that human activity resulting 
from private interests toward which is focused the 
whole energy of both will and character. The use of 
the term 'will' is to designate the principle source of 
human activity, while 'character' is said to indicate 
the conjunction of will and intelligence. Since 
'character' also refers to all the peculiar idiosyn-
crasies which constitute a particular individual and 
his concerns, Hegel chooses to use the word 'passion* 
in order to comprehend that particular inclination of 
character in which the will is directed toward the 
attainment, not of private goals alone, but of purposes 
shared in by the community as a whole. Passion, as the 
motivating force in history, is not irrational passion, 
which as Hegel remarks, falls outside the scope of 
history.[9] Rather, it is passion which is informed by 
reason or the Idea, as such it has as its ultimate 
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purpose, not some particular aim, but the developing 
universal aim of Spirit. It is only in this sense, 
then, that Hegel can proclaim that "nothing great in 
the World has been accomplished without passion."[10] 
In order to clarify the function of human activity 
in Hegel's philosophy of history it may be useful to 
consider Charles Taylor's discussion of Hegel as an 
exemplification of what he calls the 'expressionist 
tradition'.111) As defined by Taylor, expressionism is 
a way of thinking that stresses unity and its expres-
sive manifestations; it regards freedom, conceived in 
terms of authentic self-expression, as the central 
value of human life, and it characterizes 'expressive 
unity' as the unity of the individual with himself, 
nature, and other men. For expressivism, the concept 
of human nature involves the notion of an inner force 
or drive seeking to impose itself on external reality. 
The development of man and the realization of human 
potential, therefore, is viewed as the manifestation of 
this immanent drive seeking to realize itself. 
From this expressionist perspective emerged the 
passionate desire for unity, as well as a reaction to 
the Enlightenment conception of nature, especially 
human nature, as an aggregate of universal and un-
changeable facts. Furthermore, the maintenance of this 
unity necessitated the rejection of the division of 
life into separate and distinct regions or activities, 
including the familiar distinctions between soul and 
body, reason and passion, man and nature. All of these 
dichotomies were seen as distorting the true nature of 
man conceived as a unified stream of life in which no 
single aspect could be properly understood in abstrac-
tion from all others. Taylor correctly argues that 
this feature of the expressionist tradition is of prime 
importance for grasping Hegel's philosophical project 
which is strongly anti-dualistic. It attempts to over-
come all rigid dichotomies, especially the distinction 
between Spirit and Nature, or more abstractly, the 
division between subjectivity and objectivity. 
The problem faced by Hegel, then, is to provide an 
adequate ontological foundation for this (assumed) 
unity between Spirit and Nature. As we have already 
seen, the locus of this unity is human nature; but if 
the highest spiritual aspect of man, his freedom and 
self-consciousness, is to be harmonized with his 
natural being, then nature must be seen as having an 
inclination toward the realization of spiritual 
goals.(121 If this is so, then nature can no longer be 
looked upon as being a conglomeration of brute, ir-
rational forces in opposition to reason, rather, it 
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must be the implicit essence of nature to tend toward 
spirituality. In other words, underlying or immanent 
in nature must be a spiritual principle struggling to 
make itself known. For Hegel, this notion of a 
spiritual principle immanent in nature takes the form 
of an absolute Spirit which, while implicit in nature, 
reaches its fullest expression in human consciousness. 
Man is the means whereby the absolute Spirit achieves a 
completeness of self-expression which was only poten-
tially present in nature. It must be recalled, 
however, that Spirit is not entirely reducible to the 
consciousness of man, for it is also present throughout 
nature as a whole, albeit in an unconscious (potential) 
state which is moving towards a consciousness of itself 
(actuality) which is only ultimately achieved in man. 
Since the process of history is still incomplete, 
the final aim of historical progress is not made ex-
plicit as a distinct object of human knowledge or 
desire. Although human individuals may be unaware of 
the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal prin-
ciple is present in them as an unconscious, natural 
instinct, which is ever seeking to express itself. 
Hence, the history of the world does not begin with a 
fully conscious aim, rather, it 
begins with its general aim--the realization of 
the Idea of Spirit--only in an implicit form (an 
sich) that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoun-
dly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole 
process of History (as already observed), is 
directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a 
conscious one.[13] 
In order to make this immanent drive fully conscious, 
Spirit must realize its aim in the world of objective 
existence and thereby make it an object for conscious-
ness. By becoming conscious of a state of affairs in 
the world as one which engenders freedom, Spirit (i.e., 
human consciousness) recognizes that the objective 
world, as its own product, is none other than the 
realization of its own inner drive toward freedom. In 
realizing this aim. Spirit finds and contemplates it-
self in concrete existence. 
History reaches its culmination in a community or 
people which is in conformity with the Idea of Spirit 
as freedom, as it develops and unfolds itself in human 
activity. As Hegel observes, the social instinct of 
man implies a conscious purpose for life and property, 
but when society has been established, this purpose 
becomes more comprehensive.(14| For it is only in the 
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community, within a social context, that self-con-
sciousness and freedom can be achieved. In this way, 
the Idea is realized in history, not all at once, but 
in definite historical stages which are identified with 
actual historical peoples or cultures. Each stage of 
history is embodied in a certain people who are more or 
less adequate embodiments of Spirit and who struggle to 
express the Idea of freedom at that particular stage of 
development. 
Given the view that history is the succession of 
world-historical peoples, in the course of history two 
factors are important.[15J The first is the preser-
vation of a people or a state. This period in the life 
of a people represents the activity of individual men 
who participate in a common purpose and labor to ac-
tualize those possibilities inherent in that historical 
stage. Once this purpose is achieved, however, the 
people find themselves without a common goal; as a 
result, the society begins to break down. Hence, the 
second factor is the decline and fall of a people. 
World history, hov/ever, continues on, progressing 
toward an even higher conception of itself. This pro-
gression is the result of the inner development of the 
Idea of Spirit as it works itself out in the activity 
of individuals who are its 'agents'. At this point, 
says Hegel, occur "those momentous collisions between 
existing, acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and 
those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed 
system; which assail and even destroy its foundations 
and existence."(16] These new possibilities are now in 
the process of becoming historical fact, for they re-
present a universal which, while surpassing the previ-
ous state of affairs, was potentially (but not yet 
actually) present in that state. Those members of 
society who 'grasp' this higher universal and make it 
their own purpose are called by Hegel: world-histori-
cal individuals. 
It is here, however, that we seem to be presented 
v/ith a problem. Contemporary commentators on Hegel 
disagree with regard to the extent that the world-
historical individual can be said to 'grasp' this 
higher universal. In other words, it is far from clear 
to what degree that historical individual is aware of 
the significance of his actions. It is to this problem 
that we must now turn. 
Ill 
One of the distinctive features of Hegel's philoso-
phy of histoi-y is the apparent disparity between sub-
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jective intentions and objective historical results. 
For Hegel, world-historical events are not necessarily 
the result of the conscious intentions of the histor-
ical actors. The connection of events produced by 
passion, 
involves also the fact that in history an ad-
ditional result is commonly produced by human ac-
tions beyond that which they aim at and obtain--
that which they immediately recognize and desire. 
They gratify their own interest; but something 
further is thereby accomplished, latent in the 
actions in question, though not present to their 
consciousness, and not included in their de-
sign. J17 J 
Hegel calls this phenomenon the 'cunning of Reason'. 
In this image. Reason is represented as using the pas-
sions of men to fulfill its own purposes. Particular 
men and their subjective intentions clash in the battle 
of history, but the universal purpose remains concealed 
in the background. 
It is not the general idea that is implicated in 
opposition and combat, and that is exposed to 
danger. It remains in the background, untouched 
and uninjured. This may be called the cunning of 
reason--that it sets the passions to work for 
itself, while that which develops its existence 
through such impulsion pays the penalty, and 
suffers loss.[18] 
Hegel's view of the hero in history, then, seems to 
have this double aspect: on the one hand, the world-
historical individual is the efficient agent of change 
and historical progress; on the other hand, he appears 
to be only the means or instrument of a higher and 
broader purpose, in the face of which his own aims and 
interests are of little or no importance.[19] So while 
a Caesar or a Napoleon may have been motivated by their 
own ambitions, Reason, in its subtle act of cunning, 
managed to use these passions and ambitions to further 
its own goals.[20] 
According to Shlomo Avlneri, this scenario contains 
an epistemological difficulty which indicates a number 
of questions that Hegel failed to answer properly.[21] 
When Hegel refers to the world-historical individual as 
an 'agent' or an 'instrument* he assumes not only that 
these individuals may have been motivated by interests 
far inferior to the ultimate end of history, but also 
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that they may not even have been aware of the histori-
cal significance of their actions. Yet textual evi-
dence suggests, says Avineri, that Hegel had problems 
deciding just to v/hat extent the historical individuals 
were aware of the significance of v/hat they were doing. 
Avineri cites passages from Reason in History v/hich, in 
his opinion, illustrate three variations on this theme: 
(a) The historical men, world historical individ-
uals, are those who grasp. . . . a higher 
universal, make it their own purpose and 
realize this purpose in accordance with the 
higher law of Spirit. . . . The v/orld 
historical persons, the heroes of their age, 
must therefore be recognized as its seers. 
(b) Caesar was motivated not only by his own 
private interest, but acted instinctively to 
bring to pass that which the times required. 
(c) Such individuals have no consciousness of the 
Idea as such. They are practical and politi-
cal men.(22] 
From these passages, Avineri finds Hegel describing 
the world-historical individual as either (a) wholly 
conscious of the universal Idea as such, (b) only in-
stinctively conscious of it, or (c) totally unaware of 
it. He goes on to conclude that "with all the possible 
allowance for the varieties of expression and nuance, 
no adequate explanation can be given for what must in 
the last resort be viewed as a series of contradictory 
statements."(23) It is my contention, however, that 
these statements are not contradictory, and when con-
sidered in the context of Hegel's philosophy of his-
tory, can.be seen to form, if not a correct, at least a 
consistent position.(24] 
Beginning with (c) the last variation, we are told 
that the historical individuals possess no con-
sciousness of the Idea as such, they are totally 
unaware of it. If this is meant to say that the 
individual, at some given moment in the process of 
historical development, is unaware of the final aim of 
history—the Idea of Spirit in and for itself--then far 
from being a debatable issue, is quite to the point. 
It is not even correct to question whether or not such 
individuals were, in fact, aware of the Idea as such, 
for in principle, they could not have known it. 
According to Hegel, reason or the Idea i3 immanent 
in historical existence and only reaches its own per-
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fection in and through this existence. But in the ac-
tual historical development of the Idea, the subjective 
side, consciousness as such, is not yet able to know 
the (abstract) final aim of history, for it is at that 
moment in the process of unfolding itself and hence in-
complete. The complete Idea of Spirit, then, cannot 
serve as the distinctively known object of interest for 
the historical individual. If Hegel is pressed into 
revealing who is aware of the Idea implicit in history, 
his answer is readily forthcoming—the philosopher, or 
at least Hegel himself. But knowledge of the Idea is 
relative and dependent upon one's position in the 
process of the Idea's historical self-unfolding. The 
Idea can only be known to the degree that it has ac-
tualized itself in objective existence and thereby 
renders itself knowable. Hegel is careful to point out 
that philosophy cannot give instruction as to v/hat the 
v/orld ought to be, for it can only understand the Idea 
insofar as it has been actualized in the real 
v/orld. [25] 
If the historical actors are not and, in principle, 
cannot be aware of the final aim of history) what is it 
that they are aware of, or are we to conclude that they 
are totally ignorant of what they are doing? What is 
it that distinguishes them from their fellowmen? Given 
Avineri's analysis, we appear to have two choices: 
either (a) the world-historical individuals are those 
who grasp a higher universal and make it their purpose 
or (b) they are those who acted instinctively to bring 
about that v/hich the times required. If Hegel is to be 
seen as holding a consistent position, however, then 
these two statements cannot be mutually exclusive al-
ternatives, but rather, two ways of expressing one and 
the same fundamental insight. 
In discussing Caesar, Hegel asserts that he was 
motivated not only by personal ambition, but that "he 
acted instinctively to bring to pass that which the 
times required", it was "an unconscious impulse that 
occasioned the accomplishment of that for which the 
time was ripe".[26] Such is the position of all great 
historical men: their own particular wills coincide 
with the general will of Spirit as it strives toward 
self-realization. They may be called 'Heroes' only in-
sofar as they derive their purpose: 
. . . from a secret source whose content is still 
hidden and has not yet broken through to 
existence. The source of their actions is the 
inner spirit, still hidden beneath the surface 
but already knocking against the outer world as 
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against a shell, in order finally, to burst forth 
and break it Into pieces; for it is a kernal 
different from that which belongs to the 
shell.1271 
What is essential is that the will of Spirit is not 
something other than the will of man, for this 'inner 
spirit' is the unconscious instinct of all men. The 
people follow the historical hero because he shows them 
what their own inner drive or instinct is and carries 
it out. Thus the power of Spirit is identical with an 
inner drive which is present in all men, one that is 
instinctual and, therefore, not always fully com-
prehended in thought. Only after what is implicitly 
present as an instinctual drive has been made explicit 
in actual reality can it be comprehended as an object 
of thought. 
It has already been noted that this instinctual 
drive is not to be regarded as blind, irrational 
passion, which as such falls outside the scope of his-
tory. Man is the unity of Spirit and Nature, and his 
passion is imbued by reason, informed by the Idea. 
Historical individuals are intelligent, thinking be-
ings, who had an insight into the conditions of their 
own time and realized (if only vaguely) v/hat was 'ripe 
for development'. They were aware of the possibil-
ities, inherent in those conditions, which were about 
to be actualized. 
This v/as the very Truth for their age, for their 
world; the species next in order, so to speak, 
and which was already formed in the womb of time. 
It was theirs to know this nascent principle, the 
necessary, directly sequent step in progress, 
which the world was to take; to make this their 
aim, and to expend their energy in promoting 
it.[28J 
In understanding the conditions of their time, the 
world-historical individuals instinctively grasp a 
higher universal in terms of the possibilities implicit 
in the present state of affairs. [29) As v/e have seen, 
once a given society has fully actualized its own 
potential, it ceases to have a purpose or goal to 
strive for and consequently, begins to collapse. 
Concealed in this process of decline, however, are new 
possibilities which will serve as the basis for the 
next stage of development. It is the historical in-
dividuals who grasp these latent possibilities and 
struggle to make them a reality. By so doing, they do 
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not theoretically comprehend the universal principle 
they are actualizing, for they are primarily men of 
action. These men follow their own passions and wills, 
but what they pursue is the universal which is implicit 
in these passions and instinctual drives. In this way, 
"the special interest of passion is thus inseparable 
from the actualization of the universal."[30) 
The greatness of historical individuals, therefore, 
does not lie in their being the instruments of Spirit. 
In fact, the metaphors of 'instrument' and 'agent', if 
understood in the usual sense, are not applicable in 
this context, although Hegel does use them. Ordinari-
ly, an instrument is that which is used by an agent in 
order to accomplish some task. One is tempted to con-
clude that in history the real agent is Spirit, which 
merely uses men as instruments for its own purposes. 
But in the process of historical development, the in-
strument and the agent are not two separate entities, 
rather, they are identical, "for the Spirit which had 
taken this fresh step in history is the inmost soul of 
all individuals, but in a state of unconsciousness 
which the great men in question aroused."{31) The 
great men are those who are first to give a voice to 
this unconscious instinct present in all men. In 
knowing the conditions of their time, these men are in-
stinctively aware of what is to come. Historical 
peoples follow these great men, for they sense the 
pov/er of their own 'inner spirit' embodied there. It 
is the historical individuals who show the way to what 
all men instinctively desire.(32) 
If what has been said thus far is accurate, how are 
we to explain the role of the 'cunning of Reason' in 
historical progress? Walter Kaufmann, for example, as-
serts that the 'cunning of Reason' amounts to no more 
than another way of saying that "in world history the 
actions of men also produce results quite different 
from their purposes."(33} Although this is correct as 
far as it goes, it doesn't go far enough. In fact, it 
seems to be a rather cavalier way of avoiding a much 
deeper issue. For with the introduction of this no-
tion, Hegel still appears to be saying that the actions 
of men are nothing but the means used by Spirit or 
Reason for its own purposes which often go against 
man's will and conscious intention. 
IV 
In order to adequately grasp what Hegel understands 
by the 'cunning of Reason' as it operates in history, 
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it is necessary to consider this notion in its purely 
theoretical context, that is, in the context of Hegel's 
Logic, and more precisely, in the third category of the 
objective notion, namely, teleology. While I will 
focus my attention only on this category, it should be 
noted that teleology presupposes the two previous 
categories of mechanism and chemism. 
Teleological development, according to Hegel, 
proceeds in three stages: the subjective End, the End 
in process of accomplishment, and the End accomplished. 
Briefly speaking, the first element is the purely ab-
stract universal; the second element represents the ac-
tivity of the universal wherein it acquires a par-
ticular content; and the third element indicates the 
culmination of this process in which the universal 
"returns by its own means back to itself, and coalesces 
with itself."(34) 
What should be evident from even this brief 
description is that in teleological development these 
three elements are not separate and distinct, but are 
really three aspects of one process viewed at various 
stages of development. This is the highest form of 
teleology which is called 'immanent teleology1. Hegel, 
however, does not begin with the highest form, rather, 
he begins with the lower, form of 'external teleology1, 
in which these elements do appear to be distinct from 
one another. Let us now consider the details of this 
process, as well as the movement from external to in-
ternal teleology. 
First of all, Hegel discusses the subjective End, 
by which he means not necessarily an end entertained in 
consciousness, but rather, a tendency toward an end, 
whether this tendency is conscious or not. As subjec-
tive End, the notion is an essential urge to posit it-
self externally by imposing itself on a mechanical or 
chemical process and thereby directing its performance 
toward a definite result. In this effort to realize 
itself, the End 'lays hold* of the object, immediately 
given, which it appropriates as a means. What had 
initially been in the subjective End as a mere urge is 
now an activity in which the End operates through its 
means in an attempt to realize itself in external 
reality. In this activity, however, the finitude of 
external teleology is revealed. For in this form, the 
subjective End appears as something external to the 
means, which presents itself as a mechanical or 
chemical whole already given, but not yet determined by 
the End.(35] 
In external teleology, then, the activity of the 
End through its means is directed against objectivity 
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as an 'original presupposition*, the nature of which is 
to be indifferent or opposed to this type of external 
coercion. If the activity of the End were to consist 
in merely determining the immediate objectivity, the 
result of this determination would again be only a 
means and so on to infinity.|36] This positing of a 
spurious infinite is the radical defect of external 
design. In the relation of the means to the End, the 
objective return of the End to itself is not achieved, 
rather the product of this activity of the End is only 
a further means or a relative end, but not the realized 
End itself. To resolve this problem, the End, which is 
active in the means, must not determine the object as 
something external to it, rather the object must spont-
aneously conform to the End toward which it is direct-
ed, it must conform to the unity of the Notion.[371 
In this discussion of the End and its object, Hegel 
introduces the distinction betv/een 'violence1 (Gewalt) 
and the 'cunning of Reason' (List der Vernunft).[381 
If the End enters into an immediate relationship with 
the object as something external and appropriates it as 
a means, and through this means determines another 
object, it may be regarded as 'violence', insofar as 
the End appears to be of quite a different nature than 
the objects involved. Here we have only a form ex-
traneously impressed on a pre-existing material. The 
End achieved is consequently only an object which again 
becomes a means, and so on forever. Furthermore, in 
this immediate relation with objectivity, the End must 
surrender itself to the sphere of mechanism or chemism 
and thereby become subject to contingency and the loss 
of its own nature as it is in and for itself. It is 
this relationship of 'violence' that predominates in 
the sphere of external teleology. But if the End 
"posits itself in a mediate relation v/ith the object 
and interposes another object betv/een itself and it, 
(this) may be regarded as the cunning of reason."[39] 
By the 'cunning of Reason', the subjective End, which 
is the power guiding this process, contrives to keep 
itself free and preserve itself, while the objective 
things clash in 'mechanical violence* and wear them-
selves out. Reason is cunning in that while it permits 
the objects to follow their own tendencies and act upon 
one another until they waste away, not directly inter-
fering in this process, it is nevertheless only working 
out its own aims.[40] Finally, it is with the 'cunning 
of Reason* that we have the concept of immanent 
teleology as it operates in the historical development 
of the Idea. 
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If we apply this conception to the philosophy of 
history, we again seem to be presented with ' the image 
of Reason or Spirit cunningly using the passions of men 
in order to achieve its own purposes which differ from 
those of the individuals involved. But we must not 
stop here, for Hegel immediately goes on to add that in 
the 'cunning of Reason' the End does not simply keep 
itself outside the process of mechanical determination. 
Rather, it maintains itself in this process and is its 
determination.141] What virtually happens in realizing 
the End is that "the one-sided subjectivity and the 
show of objective independence confronting it are both 
cancelled", they coalesce into a unity.(42) In 'laying 
hold' of the means, the notion itself, as subjective 
End, constitutes the implicit essence of the object, 
and thus when the End is realized in the object, we 
have but the realization of the inner essence of the 
object itself. This absolute unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity, the End accomplished, is the realization 
of the Idea in and for itself. 
To sum up: the finitude of external teleology, un-
der the aspect of 'violence', consists in the fact that 
in the process of realizing itself, the object which is 
employed as a means is only externally subsumed under 
the End. But under the higher principle of immanent 
teleology and the 'cunning of Reason', the object is 
shown to be the End implicitly. So when the End is 
realized in the object, we have in actuality the mani-
festation of the inner nature of the object itself. 
Thus, the immanent teleological view of the world, un-
der the metaphorical guise of the 'cunning of Reason', 
reveals the world as struggling in time to manifest a 
purposiveness already implicit in it. 
Hegel further concludes that in immanent teleology, 
the end is the beginning, the consequent the ground, 
the effect the cause, and so on. His explanation is 
that in the light of immanent teleology all the earlier 
determinations of relationship belonging to the realm 
of 'immediate' being have lost their distinctions, and 
what was enunciated as an 'other', such as end, 
consequent, or effect, no longer can be viewed as being 
determined by an 'other', but on the contrary, are now 
posited as being identical with the simple Notion and 
as self-determining.143] As such, the necessity and 
external determination inherent in mechanism and 
chemism is 'sublated' in teleology which expresses the 
Notion as self-determining and, therefore, free. 
The following considerations may help in clarifying 
Hegel's meaning. When Hegel writes that the end is the 
beginning, he is saying nothing more than that the 
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realized End is implicitly contained in the subjective 
End as an urge or innate tendency which is later made 
explicit. When he observes that the consequent is the 
ground, he is saying that the consequent is just the 
explication of what is already implicit in the ground. 
And when he says that the effect is the cause, he is 
actually referring to a previous distinction between 
end as final cause and mere efficient causes. Effi-
cient causes belong to the sphere of mechanical neces-
sity. Here cause appears as passing into its correla-
tions and loosing its primordiality by sinking into 
dependency. The End as final cause, however, im-
plicitly contains the effect in itself. The End, 
therefore, does not pass over into dependency, but 
retains itself, that is, it carries into effect only 
itself, and is at the end (explicitly) what it was 
(implicitly) in the beginning.|44] Hence, all the 
previous distinctions of the understanding: end-begin-
ning, consequent-ground, effect-cause, etc., have lost 
their rigid distinction in the sphere of reason and im-
manent teleology. 
It should now be quite evident that Hegel's 
'cunning of Reason' is not meant to express the concep-
tion of some transcendent Spirit who uses the actions 
of men as a means to fulfill its own particular end or 
purpose. In the context of Hegel's usage, the notions 
of means and end no longer retain their usual meanings, 
nor can they be understood as being completely distinct 
from one another. Nor is it the case that Hegel sees 
the 'cunning of Reason' as going against man's will and 
conscious intentions. It does, at least minimally, 
remind us that in world history the actions of men may 
produce results which in the long run differ from the 
immediate purpose envisioned by the agents. But this 
is not to say that Reason opposes these actions and 
purposes. Rather, it indicates that there is a meaning 
and a purpose latent in historical actions of which the 
agents are not fully cognizant and which can only be 
recognized in retrospect. This in itself is not too 
extraordinary, often actions undertaken at some given 
time will have ramifications which can be understood 
only at a later date. 
If we consider the fate of historical individuals, 
we find that their desires and ambitions do appear as 
only a means to a greater end. In some sense, in-
dividuals do seem to fall under the category of means. 
But the first idea which presents itself with regard to 
means is that of something external to the end, which 
the object used as a means has no share in. But this 
is only the partial truth of mechanism and chemism. 
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Even natural objects, which are used as a means, must 
be of such a nature as to adapt themselves to their 
purposes, they must possess something in common with 
it. If this is true of natural objects, then human 
beings, as the unity of Nature and Spirit, least of all 
sustain the bare external relation of a means to a 
greater ideal aim. Not only do they in the very act of 
realizing this aim, make it an occasion for satisfying 
their personal ambitions, whose content is diverse from 
that aim, but they also participate in that ideal aim 
itself. With regard to the intrinsic import of this 
aim, men must be considered as ends in themselves, for 
the end or purpose being achieved in history is 
Freedom--Human Freedom.(45] So while individual agents 
consciously pursue their own particular ends, the ends 
or goals of freedom and self-consciousness, which be-
long to the nature of man in general, are also being 
fulfilled. As Taylor concludes, far from being another 
incomprehensible Hegelian idea, the 'cunning of Reason' 
is essential for any theory of history that wants to 
give a role to unconscious motivation.(46| 
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